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Abstract 
 
In October 2013, the European Commission presented a new indicator intended to capture 
innovation outputs and outcomes and thereby “support policy-makers in establishing new or 
reinforced actions to remove bottlenecks that prevent innovators from translating ideas into 
products and services that can be successful on the market”. This article aims to evaluate the 
usefulness of the new indicator against the background of the difficulties in measuring 
innovation outputs and outcomes. We develop a unique conceptual framework for measuring 
innovation outcomes that distinguishes structural change and structural upgrading as two key 
dimensions in both manufacturing and services. We conclude that the new indicator is biased 
towards a somewhat narrowly defined “high-tech” understanding of innovation outcomes. We 
illustrate our framework proposing a broader set of outcome indicators capturing also 
structural upgrading. We find that the results for the modified indicator differ substantially for 
a number of countries, with potentially wide-ranging consequences for innovation and 
industrial policies. 
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1 Introduction 
In October 2013, the European Commission (EC) launched a new indicator (henceforth the 
EU 2020 Innovation Indicator) for measuring the EU’s progress in meeting the goals of the 
Europe 2020 Strategy and its Innovation Union flagship initiative (European Commission, 
2013). The EU 2020 Innovation Indicator is intended to measure innovation outputs and 
outcomes, complementing the headline R&D intensity indicator (R&D expenditures as a 
share of GDP) used so far for policy coordination. During the 2000s, this R&D intensity 
indicator strongly influenced research and innovation policy in Europe as the heads of state 
and government of EU member states agreed on a 3% target for this indicator at their 
Barcelona summit in 2002 (European Commission, 2002). Over time, both policy makers and 
researchers recognised that the R&D intensity indicator had certain limitations in order to 
serve as the main indicator to monitor improvements of the EU in becoming the most 
competitive knowledge-intensive society. On the one hand, industry structure strongly 
determines R&D intensity (Mathieu and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2010; Reinstaller 
and Unterlass, 2012), favouring countries with R&D-intensive industries. On the other hand, 
relying only on input indicators might result in overrating unproductive R&D investment 
(Edquist and Zabala-Itturiagagoitia, 2015). 
The European Council tried to solve these problems and asked the EC to develop “a new 
indicator measuring the share of fast-growing innovative companies in the economy”1 to add 
an output and outcome dimension to the input dimension already provided by the R&D 
intensity indicator. In the following two years, the Commission services experimented with 
different approaches to develop and measure such an indicator, consulting also with a “High 
Level Panel on the Measurement of Innovation” (2013) and finally presented the EU 2020 
Innovation Indicator. It combines four individual indicators intended to measure innovation 
outputs and outcomes into a single composite indicator: (1) patent applications, (2) economic 
significance of knowledge-intensive sectors, (3) trade performance of knowledge-intensive 
                                                 
1 Conclusion of 4/2/2011 (Council doc. EUCO 2/1/11 REV1). 
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goods and services and (4) significance of fast-growing firms in innovative sectors. The four 
individual indicators are also part of the Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS, from 2016 on: 
European Innovation Scoreboard).  
Since tools such as the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator are not only used as a purely 
informational basis but also feed into evidence-based policy advice, e.g. country specific 
recommendations within the Europe 2020 strategy or smart specialisation initiatives, the 
adequacy of the information provided becomes crucial. It is therefore critical to know whether 
the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator measures innovation outputs and outcomes without bias. 
This paper attempts to evaluate the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator against this policy 
background. We develop a conceptual framework of innovation outcomes at the sector level 
that distinguishes two types of innovation outcomes: (1) structural change towards 
knowledge-intensive sectors, and (2) structural upgrading, i.e. moving closer to the frontier2 
within existing sectors.  
An illustrative empirical analysis using novel indicators for structural upgrading reveals that 
the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator is reasonably well reflecting processes of structural change 
while it does not appropriately address structural upgrading. The indicator therefore overrates 
countries specialised in knowledge-intensive sectors far from the frontier. With the same 
reasoning it underrates countries specialised in less-knowledge intensive sectors close to the 
frontier. In this respect, the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator solves only one of the two 
problems associated with the R&D intensity indicator. While it complements the input 
perspective with an outcome perspective, it also strongly focuses on the share of sectors 
classified as knowledge-intensive in the economy and tends to ignore actual innovation 
outcomes. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 develops a conceptual framework of innovation 
outcome measurement. Based on this framework, section 3 analyses the strengths and 
weaknesses of the new EU 2020 Innovation Indicator and compares the results of this 
                                                 
2 We use the term “frontier” broadly in this paper, indicating the highest level of the concept of interest, such as 
knowledge intensity, quality, etc., referring to the performance of both manufacturing and services. 
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indicator with a more comprehensive outcome indicator that includes structural upgrading. In 
Section 4 we discuss the policy relevance of our findings and suggest ways for improving the 
measurement of innovation outcomes at the country level. 
2 Measuring Innovation Outputs and Outcomes at the Country Level 
2.1 Innovation Outputs vs. Outcomes 
Traditionally, most attempts to measure innovation focused on innovation inputs, in particular 
R&D (see the Frascati Manual; OECD, 2015) and human resources for innovation (see the 
Canberra Manual; OECD and Eurostat, 1995). While these approaches have been by and 
large successful in terms of delivering comparable international data on the input side, 
comparable and reliable indicators on innovation outputs and outcomes at the country-level 
are still largely missing in spite of the efforts by the Oslo Manual (OECD and Eurostat, 2005) 
to harmonise measurement of innovation output and outcomes (see Godin, 2003, 2007; 
Freeman and Soete, 2009). 
A starting point to derive country-level indicators of innovation outputs and outcomes is the 
literature on the innovation production function (e.g., Pakes and Griliches, 1984; Bernstein 
and Singh, 2006; Godin, 2007; Roper et al., 2008; Chen and Guan, 2011). In addition, stage 
process models from the evaluation literature (e.g., the logic chain model) try to identify 
critical areas of innovation performance measurement, including wider impacts of innovation 
on society and the economy (e.g. McLaughlin and Jordan, 1999). 
Following this literature and the terminology of the Oslo Manual, firms can transform 
innovation inputs (e.g. R&D, human resources, research infrastructures and the stock of 
existing knowledge) in a first stage into intermediate outputs, such as patents, often referred to 
as throughputs (Grupp, 1997; Frietsch and Schmoch, 2006) and potentially3, in a second 
stage, into innovation outputs. They refer to the direct results of innovative efforts of 
economic actors. This is typically the introduction of an innovation on the market (product 
                                                 
3 Not all patents are used for the introduction of innovations (section 3.1). 
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innovation, marketing innovation) or in the economic actor's operation (process innovation, 
organisational innovation). Typical measures of innovation output are counts of product and 
process innovations (see Geroski, 1994) or the share of firms that have introduced 
innovations. 
Innovation outcomes are the consequences of the introduction of innovations, among them the 
economic effects of innovation outputs on the firms introducing them. Introducing an 
innovation and even less so applying for a patent does not automatically have economic 
effects. A product innovation, for example, needs to be sold to users, and a process innovation 
must lead to significant changes in cost or other production related inputs in order to generate 
economic effects. Linked to these potential firm-level outcomes are economy-wide outcomes, 
also called impacts, resulting from the diffusion of an innovation from the firm and sector 
where the innovation originated onto other industries and finally the economy as a whole (see 
the seminal work by Rogers, 2003, on the diffusion of innovations). These outcomes also 
include non-economic ones, e.g. health benefits of new medical equipment. In the present 
paper, we refer to the economic consequences of all four types of innovation output identified 
by the Oslo Manual (product, process, marketing, organisational), in line with the scope of the 
EU Innovation Indicator. Figure A1 in the Appendix provides a graphical presentation of this 
input-output framework. 
While the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator is a systematic attempt to provide internationally 
comparable data on the output and outcome dimension of innovation, it has important 
limitations. First, while the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator tries to address innovation outputs, 
it does so only based on patent data which reflect the output of R&D processes but should, for 
several reasons discussed below, not be equated with innovation output. Second, we will 
argue that the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator adopts a “high-tech” view on innovation because 
the three indicators relating to innovation outcomes (significance of knowledge-intensive 
sectors, the competitiveness of knowledge-intensive goods and services, and the significance 
of fast-growing firms in innovative sectors) mainly attempt to measure structural change of 
economic activity towards predefined sectors with high knowledge intensity. The sole focus 
on such sectors, however, neglects innovation outcomes of firms in less-knowledge-intensive 
sectors that may lead to an upgrading of such sectors and may improve economy-wide 
performance substantially. It also neglects actual innovation outcomes in knowledge-intensive 
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sectors as we don’t know, e.g., whether fast-growing firms in these sectors achieved their 
growth because of innovation.  
2.2 Innovation outcomes: structural change vs. upgrading 
Economic effects of innovation have often been related to the degree of novelty of 
innovations, with scholars distinguishing between “radical” innovations, describing 
completely new goods and services or production processes, and “incremental” innovations, 
relating to performance improvements of existing goods and services or production processes 
which do not fundamentally alter their characteristics (e.g., Dosi, 1982; Freeman and Soete, 
1997). More radical innovation may lead to higher productivity and growth effects as a higher 
degree of novelty can potentially allow for a more substantial change in production methods 
or performance characteristics of new goods and services. Radical innovation may also 
mobilise new demand by offering entirely new applications. If radical innovations indeed 
generated superior economic effects, the measurement of innovation outcomes would need to 
focus on capturing the degree of novelty of innovations which is difficult. Quantifying the 
radicalness of innovation —or its degree of novelty— remains a substantial challenge for 
empirical research.4 
Interestingly, Saviotti and Metcalfe (1984) argued that radical technical changes do not 
necessarily lead to radical innovations in terms of how product features change. For example, 
the change from propeller to jet aircraft technology provided only incremental service 
improvements in terms of faster travel times while incremental technical changes can lead to 
radical innovations in terms of the services they provide to users, such as the Smartphone 
                                                 
4 Efforts include (a) “the objective approach”, technometrics or literature-based measures of novelty, which are 
based on information from technical and trade journals (Grupp, 1994; Kleinknecht and Reijnen, 1993; Coombs 
et al., 1996), and (b) “the subjective approach”, surveying firms about novelty as outlined in the Oslo Manual 
and applied in the Community Innovation Surveys. The Oslo Manual sets a threshold level for a change to count 
as an innovation by referring to the concept of “significant improvement”. Beyond that, it distinguishes between 
innovations which are “new to the firm”, “new to the market” and “new to the world”. While the first approach 
is cumbersome and barely works for services, the second is a subjective assessment which has been shown to 
vary with the level of development of countries or markets (see Knell and Srholec, 2009). 
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(Vogelstein, 2013)5. In terms of innovation outcomes, incremental innovations may hence be 
as important as radical ones. A large variety of literature provides support for this view. While 
the focus of the early innovation literature was clearly devoted to radical innovations 
(Schumpeter, 1961; compare also Smith, 2005), the importance and frequent occurrence of 
incremental innovations has inter alia been outlined by Kline and Rosenberg (1986) and 
Lundvall (2010), not least because they mirror trends in both competition strategy and 
growing complexity of knowledge bases. 
First, in countries close to the frontier, innovation is the dominant business strategy for many 
firms, and innovation processes become routine elements of firm activities (Hölzl and Janger, 
2014). Increasing competitive pressure by low-cost firms may lead to upgrading of existing 
products and processes (Bloom et al., 2016). In many mature industries, radical innovation by 
incumbents could endanger their return on large sunk investments, with successful 
innovations mainly replacing the incumbent’s old profit position (Arrow, 1962, Reinganum 
1983), so that moving forward by small steps may be the rational competitive strategy.  
Second, the growing complexity of knowledge leads to an increasing specialisation of firms 
on core competencies, in turn contributing to increased path-dependency of technological 
progress at the firm level. Firms usually learn along their cumulative knowledge bases, guided 
by firm-specific routines (see Dosi and Nelson, 2010, for a recent survey), and this results 
rather in incremental than radical innovation (Pavitt, 2005).6 
A focus on the measurement of the economic effects of radical vs. incremental innovations 
may hence be of limited relevance. Therefore, we conclude that capturing innovation 
outcomes at the firm level according to novelty should not be a main requirement for 
                                                 
5 Radical and incremental changes can also be intertwined. The accumulation of incremental improvements over 
time may eventually constitute a radical (technological) innovation (e.g. as in the case of spark generators, the 
weight of which was reduced from 118kg to 2kg over a span of 30 years), while subsequent incremental 
(technical) innovations may be necessary for a preceding radical (technical) innovation to create radical new 
service characteristics (e.g., as in the case of Teflon; see Kline and Rosenberg, 1986). 
6 “It is precisely the paradigmatic cumulative nature of technological knowledge that accounts for the relatively 
ordered nature of the observed patterns of technological change… [ ] technological search processes in each firm 
are cumulative processes too. What the firm can hope to do technologically in the future is narrowly constrained 
by what it has been capable of doing in the past” (Dosi, 1988, p. 1129f.). 
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indicators measuring such outcomes. Instead, we see more potential for identifying and 
measuring innovation outcomes at the industry level. Dosi (1988) calls the economic effect of 
innovations an asymmetry-creating effect which will improve the competitive position of a 
firm, e.g. through lower prices or better goods and services. Dosi (1988) notes as a result that 
industrial structure is endogenous to innovative activity, i.e. that outcomes of innovation are 
reflected in changes of industry structure. From a measurement perspective, we propose that 
there are two possible ways for innovation outputs to show up in outcomes at the sector level 
of both manufacturing and services, i.e. as economic benefits of innovation. The first, which 
we call structural change, reflects a differential growth of value added across industries, 
away from industries with lower levels of knowledge intensity to industries with higher 
intensity. By such a change, the share of output in knowledge-intensive industries in an 
economy’s total output will increase.  
The second, which we call structural upgrading, features differential performance of firms 
within industries without necessarily changing the overall composition of economic activities. 
This differential performance may be reflected in moving to more knowledge-intensive 
activities within a sector, thereby preserving or reinforcing existing competitive advantages. 
Dosi (1988) has conceptualised this intra-sectoral movement of firms through innovation in 
terms of changing distances to the frontier at the firm level. Such upgrading may not 
necessarily be reflected in differential value added growth at the firm level. Instead, its 
economic benefit may consist in increasing the quality of goods and services to be able to 
hold market shares and prices constant when confronted with low-cost competition or in 
keeping costs down to stay competitive in spite of higher wages paid to a firm’s workforce. 
A simple conceptual model can illustrate both channels (see Figure 1, a more formal version 
is presented in the Appendix, Figure A2). The model starts with innovation outcomes at the 
firm level, which result from the characteristics of innovation outputs.7 On the one hand, 
changes to existing processes can decrease a firm’s production costs. This either allows to 
reduce costs relative to competing firms or to keep them constant relative to competitors that 
                                                 
7 For brevity, we only mention product and process innovation, but the model works equally for marketing and 
organisational innovation. 
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are also trying to reduce costs. Depending on the amount of relative cost reduction and the 
ensuing price setting, value added and market shares generated by a firm’s goods and services 
may remain unchanged or may increase.8 On the other hand, innovations can also change 
existing product quality, keep product quality unchanged relative to competitors or increase it, 
with impacts on value added or market shares as a function of corresponding price setting. In 
addition, a new successful product can increase value added (net of any substitution effects 
with the older product).  
Figure 1: Innovation outcomes at the firm and the industry level: a conceptual model 
1. Outcomes of improving existing product/process
• Costs unchanged or decreased
• Increasedmarket share and/or
value added
• Quality unchanged or increased
• Increasedmarket share and/or
value added
2. Outcomeof introducing a new product
• Increased value added (net of
substitutioneffects)
Structural change towards
more knowledge‐intensive 
industries
• Share of knowledge‐intensive 
industries in total value added
increases
Structural upgrading within
industries
• Moving to more knowledge‐
intensive segments within
industries
• Climbing the quality ladder
• Moving closer to the frontier
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Source: Authors’ own presentation. 
                                                 
8 “Whenever at any time a given quantity of output costs less to produce than the same or a smaller quantity did 
cost or would have cost before, we may be sure, if prices of factors have not fallen, that there has been 
innovation somewhere” (Schumpeter, 1939, p. 89, as cited by Godin, 2007, p. 1390). 
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These outcomes of innovations at the firm level translate either into economic effects of 
innovation changing the sector composition of activities (structural change through higher 
value added growth of industries characterised by high knowledge intensity relative to 
industries showing lower knowledge intensities) or change the intra-sector composition of 
activities by moving towards segments of higher knowledge intensity within the same 
industry (structural upgrading).  
Both outcomes, structural change and upgrading, are shown schematically in Figure 2. 
Industries from either manufacturing or services are roughly classified in four broad groups 
by knowledge intensity. The circle for each group represents its average knowledge intensity, 
going from low intensity, on the right, to high intensity, on the left. Within each of the 
groupings, firms can be more or less knowledge-intensive, or display varying distances to the 
frontier in each grouping, sliding up or down the vertical axis. Structural upgrading (SU) then 
occurs when firms (and consequently industries composed of those firms in a country) move 
upward on the vertical axis. Structural change (SC) occurs when there is a horizontal move, 
from industries with lower levels of knowledge intensity, towards industries with higher 
knowledge intensity. 
Figure 2: Schematic display of structural change and upgrading 
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Source: Authors’ own presentation. 
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While radical innovations may be more likely than incremental innovations to trigger 
structural change, Figure 1 and 2 show that structural change can well be the result of 
incrementally improving products and processes, e.g. when the firm is already active in a very 
knowledge-intensive industry (e.g. iterations of the latest Smartphone). On the other hand, a 
radically new product in a less knowledge-intensive sector may merely prevent the decline of 
the industry (see, e.g. the development of breathable and waterproof textiles). Put differently, 
developments along a technological trajectory may not only lead to structural upgrading but 
also to structural change at the industry level, while a new technological paradigm may not 
necessarily initiate structural change towards more knowledge-intensive industries. 
Policymakers often focus on increasing the share of knowledge-intensive goods and services 
in the economy (structural change), as evidenced by what some call the competitiveness-
induced “obsession” with “high-technology” goods and services (see Godin, 2004). Empirical 
evidence however shows that structural upgrading as an outcome of innovation is equally 
relevant for economic performance. Kline and Rosenberg (1986) point to the example of the 
US electric power generation industry which achieved high rates of productivity growth 
without introducing any single major innovation but by constantly upgrading in the form of 
slow, cumulative improvements in the efficiency of centralised thermal power plants9. 
Robertson et al. (2009) observe that the development of both higher-quality products and new 
products can offset the maturation of older industries, limiting declines in demand for goods 
and services of low knowledge-intensity sectors. A firm-level analysis of the global paper 
industry by Ghosal and Nair-Reichert (2009) finds that the impact of investments in 
modernisation builds up over time to create significant performance differences with respect 
to firms’ productivity and competitive position. The empirical literature agrees that innovation 
outputs significantly influence economic performance in all industries, including less 
knowledge-intensive ones, either through product differentiation or cost reduction (Peneder, 
2010; Kirner et al., 2009). 
                                                 
9“… it is a serious mistake (increasingly common in societies that have a growing preoccupation with high 
technology industries) to equate economically important innovations with that subset associated with 
sophisticated technologies” (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986, p. 278). 
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Also the international trade literature provides evidence on the importance of structural 
upgrading. In Grossman and Helpman’s (1991) North-South trade model, every traded 
product is positioned on a “quality ladder”. Its production will move to the ‘South’ once the 
‘South’ is able to imitate its technology. As a result, firms from the ‘North’ are forced to 
innovate and bring out the next generation of higher quality products in order to escape low 
cost competition. The empirical trade literature confirms this effect as advanced countries try 
to cope with the adjustment pressure from rising emerging economies (see, e.g., Schott, 2008; 
Martin and Mejean, 2014). Bloom et al. (2016) show that Chinese import competition led to 
two distinct effects among European firms. A “within”-effect increases productivity at the 
firm level and a “between”-effect reallocates employment towards more innovative and 
technologically advanced firms. In summary, the available evidence points to the fact that 
both structural change and upgrading at the industry level are important types of innovation 
outcomes.  
2.3 Measuring structural change and structural upgrading 
The measurement of outcomes of innovation at the industry level has several benefits in 
comparison to measuring outputs or outcomes at the firm level. One is that spillover effects 
can be captured, i.e. the spread of benefits from the innovating firm to other firms, possibly 
located in different industries. A general framework of structural change and upgrading is in 
principle able to capture innovation outcomes wherever they originated, in both 
manufacturing and services and irrespective of the type of innovation (product, process, 
marketing or organisational). Measuring outcomes rather than outputs also alleviates the 
problems related to identifying an innovation’s degree of novelty. Eventually, from an 
economic perspective, the degree of novelty of an individual innovation – be it related to 
technological or service characteristics - matters less than the economic benefits of this 
innovation.  
There are a variety of indicators to measure the extent of structural change towards sectors 
with higher knowledge, R&D or innovation intensity (e.g., Peneder, 2010; Hatzichronoglou, 
1997; and Godin, 2004, for a survey). The most common approach is to calculate an 
international average of knowledge intensity for each sector and then determine the shares of 
knowledge-intensive sectors in national output. The fragmentation of international value 
chains particularly in manufacturing may however produce misleading results (Janger et al., 
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2011). As the knowledge intensity of industries is calculated on international averages rather 
than on country-specific data, a country can have high shares in knowledge-intensive sectors 
even when it hosts only less knowledge-intensive parts of the value chain, such as final 
assembly (an example being Hungary; see also Srholec, 2007). The fragmentation of the 
value chains then penalises countries specialised in the high quality or knowledge-intensive 
segments of less knowledge-intensive sectors (e.g., Austria and Italy). 
Upgrading indicators can correct for this bias by showing a country’s position in different 
knowledge intensity or quality segments within industries, but they are more difficult to build. 
So far, the most commonly used survey-based indicator which could be regarded as an 
indicator for structural upgrading is the sales share of product innovations (when weighted by 
industries’ shares in total output). This indicator has been used both in analyses of sector and 
country innovation performance (particularly by the Innovation Union Scoreboard, see 
European Commission, 2014) and in firm-level studies of innovation performance (Mairesse 
and Mohnen, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Leiponen and Helfat, 2010; Klingebiel and 
Rammer, 2014). Interestingly, the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator refrained from adopting this 
indicator for measuring innovation output, presumably due to reservations about its reliability: 
while the sales share of product innovations is useful to quantify the outcome of a firm’s 
(product) innovation efforts, comparability across firms, sectors and countries is limited 
(Kleinknecht et al., 2002; Knell and Srholec, 2009; Rammer et al., 2009). First, perceptions 
by firms of what constitutes an innovation and how novel it is may differ. While firms from 
countries at the frontier of technological change and innovation are likely to apply higher 
standards for changes to products in order to qualify as innovations, firms from catching-up 
countries may regard the adoption of a standard product as an innovation if that product has 
not been offered on their market yet. In addition, the concept of new-to-market innovations, 
which is frequently surveyed as a qualifier of product innovation,10 is also a problematic one 
since firms may refer to very different geographic and product markets when reporting market 
                                                 
10 Innovation surveys of the CIS-type usually collect information on the introduction of product innovations, 
followed by separate questions on the degree of novelty, using new-to-market vs. only new-to-firm as the main 
novelty dimension. 
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novelties. Second, comparison between industries is complicated by the fact that the sales 
share of new products is strongly driven by product life time. For this reason, the first and 
second edition of the Oslo Manual suggested collecting data on the average or typical length 
of the product life in order to control for this interference, but only a few innovation surveys 
implemented this idea. Potentially related to life-cycle aspects, but also to changing 
perceptions of innovativeness and technical survey issues such as sampling, the indicator is 
also quite volatile. 
Janger et al. (2011) suggest two outcome indicators on structural upgrading that are not based 
on firm survey data: one measuring “export quality”, i.e. the share of low-, medium- and 
high-quality exports of an industry (manufacturing only), and the other measuring R&D 
intensity of countries by correcting for industrial structure of both manufacturing and 
services. The first is now becoming more commonplace in different methodologies (e.g. 
Vandenbussche, 2014). “Export quality” is measured by unit values of exports (price per unit 
of weight). This proxy has certain shortcomings (see Aiginger, 1997, for a discussion). But all 
in all, higher shares in the higher quality segment should indicate innovation outcomes or 
commercial success of innovations, as innovations change the competitiveness of goods 
through changes of cost and quality, as outlined in section 2.2. The second indicator, R&D 
intensity of a country’s business sector corrected for industrial structure, is not per se an 
outcome indicator. However, knowing whether a country —relative to an average of R&D 
intensive benchmark countries— is R&D intensive or not given its industrial structure, allows 
for an assessment of its position on the segments of an industry in terms of its knowledge 
intensity. This indicator can also be used as a weighting scheme for structural change 
indicators (Reinstaller and Unterlass, 2012), adding an outcome dimension. As such, it could 
serve as a proxy for an outcome indicator when used in conjunction with structural change 
indicators. Both indicators empirically perform well in explaining performance differences 
between countries, complementing the information obtained from structural change 
indicators.  
In the following section, we will discuss the new EU 2020 Innovation Indicator against the 
background of our framework. As a takeaway, lack of differentiation between radical and 
incremental innovation should not overly matter if one is more interested in the economic 
effects of innovation, but any indicator trying to capture outcomes should integrate 
dimensions of structural change and upgrading. We will now continue with presenting the EU 
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2020 Innovation Indicator in more detail and assessing to which extent its measurement 
approach takes into account the conceptual consideration presented in this section.  
3 Assessment of the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator and a Proposal for a 
Modified Indicator 
3.1 The EU 2020 Innovation Indicator  
The EU 2020 Innovation Indicator is a composite indicator that consists of four components 
intended to measure different aspects of innovation outputs and outcomes: patent applications, 
economic significance of knowledge-intensive sectors, trade performance of knowledge-
intensive goods and services, and employment in fast-growing firms in innovative sectors. 
These indicators have been proposed by a High Level Panel on the Measurement of 
Innovation (2013). A fifth indicator recommended by the High Level Panel —labour 
productivity— has not been included in the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator, mainly because of 
a perceived too weak link between productivity and innovation outcome. A detailed 
description of each indicator and technical details on how the composite indicator is 
calculated can be found in Vértesy and Tarantola (2014). In the following, we assess the four 
components of the indicator with respect to the types of innovation output and outcome they 
represent. 
The first component is the number of PCT patent applications11 per billion GDP (PCT). It has 
become very common in large parts of the innovation literature to use patents as proxy for 
innovation output (among many others see Acs and Audretsch, 1989; Crépon et al., 1998; 
Bronzini and Piselli, 2016), partly because of the broad international availability of patent 
data. Nonetheless, treating patents as innovation outputs is conceptually problematic. In fact, 
already in their foundational paper, Griliches and Pakes (1980) were very explicit that patents 
are proxies for knowledge and thus often closely linked to knowledge generating processes 
                                                 
11 Applications filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) which name the European Patent Office as 
designated office in the international phase of the application procedure. 
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such as R&D. Yet, they need not be very informative about innovation output for many 
reasons. 
For example, patents may not lead to actually implemented innovations as they may merely 
be used to impede innovations by competitors (Blind et al., 2006; Moser, 2013; Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001). As a consequence, patent counts can overestimate innovation output, 
because patented technologies are not always brought into use. At the same time, large parts 
of innovation outputs are not patentable at all, leading to potential downward biases when 
measuring innovation output by patents only (Arundel and Kabla, 1998). Several authors 
show that downward biases are particularly strong in sectors with low propensities to patent, 
such as services (Scherer, 1983; Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999). 
The choice of measuring innovation outputs via patent data therefore implies conceptual 
problems. In particular, patents reflect knowledge related throughputs rather than innovation 
output. In our context of measuring innovation outcomes, patents are also likely to entail 
further measurement problems because patenting propensities differ considerably by sector, 
with high propensities found in particular in high-technology manufacturing. Using patents 
therefore reinforces a bias towards technology-driven sectors. Beyond this general bias, the 
patent component of the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator induces a further bias, because it 
reflects the development of inventions to be used on global markets by focusing on PCT 
patents. In many industries, and particularly in SMEs, innovations are not targeted towards 
global but rather to national or regional markets. As a result, firms often seek patent 
protection at national patent offices and do not go through a costly PCT application process. 
The current PCT component of the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator hence does not capture 
innovation throughputs targeted at these national or regional markets. 
The second component measures the share of employees in knowledge-intensive industries in 
total business enterprise sector employment (KIA). Knowledge-intensity of industries is 
measured for Europe as a whole rather than based on country-specific data, using one third of 
employees having a higher education degree as a threshold. As a result, countries can only 
improve their score on this indicator by employing more people in a pre-specified set of 
knowledge-intensive industries. Increased employment in sectors that are not regarded as 
knowledge-intensive will lead to a decreased score even if this increased employment is due 
to significant investments in innovation.  
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The third component should represent the competitiveness of knowledge-intensive goods and 
services by evaluating trade performance (COMP). It consists of two sub-components, the 
share of medium-high and high-tech goods in total exports (GOOD) and the share of 
knowledge-intensive services in the total service exports (SERV), again applying the same 
definition of medium-high and high-tech goods and knowledge-intensive services for all 
countries. Both components receive equal weights to calculate a single indicator. This implies 
that a country’s specialisation on either services or manufacturing is not considered. 
Moreover, as with the indicators on the employment share in knowledge-intensive sectors, the 
innovativeness of exports is determined through international averaging, so that it is not 
known for a specific country how knowledge-intensive the goods and services in question 
really are. For example, high-tech goods are identified through international classifications, 
rather than through real information on the knowledge content of country exports. Note that 
countries with a high share of tourism services exports will also be penalised, as any 
knowledge-intensive services will get a comparably lower score, even if e.g. the share of 
knowledge-intensive services in GDP between two countries was the same. 
The fourth component should represent dynamism and reflects the employment in fast-
growing firms from innovative sectors (DYN). Three types of information are combined: the 
innovativeness of a sector, the knowledge intensity of that sector, and the number of 
employees in fast-growing firms in that sector as a percentage of total sector employment. 
Both innovativeness and knowledge intensity of sectors are measured at the European level. 
Fast-growing firms are firms with ten or more employees and an average employee growth of 
10% per year over three years. Again, countries can only improve their score on this indicator 
through fast-growing firms in sectors that are, on average across countries, highly innovative. 
This is the case even if the local firms in that sector are not at all innovative. Similarly, highly 
innovative, fast-growing firms in sectors which are on average in the EU less innovative will 
not lead to a higher score. 
Three components (KIA, COMP, DYN) reward countries that reallocate resources to a pre-
specified set of knowledge-intensive, innovative sectors which are the same for all European 
member states. As such, these components are indicators of structural change, i.e. of the 
reallocation of economic activities away from industries with lower levels of knowledge 
intensity to industries with higher knowledge intensity. They fail to capture path dependent 
evolutions and structural upgrading in sectors that are on average less innovative and less 
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knowledge-intensive, but that may be crucial for the economic development of a country or 
region. They also fail to spot country differences in actual innovation outcomes of sectors 
classified as knowledge-intensive. 
This measurement approach is not in line with the European Commission’s new policy 
concept of “smart specialisation”, the goal of which is to boost regional innovation and 
economic growth by enabling regions or countries to focus on their relative strengths. A smart 
specialisation reasoning argues that a region or country (a) should not spread its scarce 
resources over a too wide range of activities, and (b) should diversify not by focusing on the 
same ‘popular’ activities as other countries (cf. the vast number of regions attempting to 
become world class biotech players), but by instead building on its own relative strengths. 
The three last components of the EU 2020 innovation indicator fail to capture such 
specialisation efforts in established sectors, inciting all regions and countries to reallocate 
their resources and activities to the exact same set of sectors. We can conclude that the four 
components of the EU 2020 indicator provide a rather limited coverage of the range of 
innovation outputs and outcomes discussed in section 2.  
As an empirical illustration of the issues arising from focusing on structural change, Table 1 
shows countries’ shares of value added in knowledge-intensive manufacturing industries12 
and of employment in knowledge-intensive activities (KIA) as defined above (including both 
manufacturing and services) along with the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator rank and GDP per 
capita. We show two different industry classifications because some countries such as 
Luxembourg, the UK and Cyprus achieve very high shares in KIA mainly due to a (less R&D 
intensive) large financial services sector (also contributing to their SERV score), whereas 
other countries such as Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic achieve relatively large 
shares of R&D intensive technology-driven manufacturing industries due to their integration 
                                                 
12 We use an updated version of the classification developed by Peneder (2002) which is based on a cluster 
analysis of economic variables (labour intensity, capital intensity, advertising sales ratio, R&D sales ratio) 
obtained from the US manufacturing industry in the period 1990-1995. “Technology oriented” manufacturing 
industries include chemicals and biotechnology; new information and communication technologies; and vehicles 
for transport. We obtain similar results when using the OECD’s high-tech classification (Hatzichronoglou, 
1997). 
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in global value chains of innovation-intensive industries such as automobiles (affecting also 
their DYN and GOOD scores).13  
Table 1: Sector specialisation in knowledge-intensive industries, EU 2020 Innovation 
Indicator rank and GDP per capita, sorted by GDP per capita, 2012 
 
Employment share of 
education intensive 
sectors in total 
economy (KIA), in % 
Value added share of 
technology-driven 
industries in 
manufacturing, in % 
EU 2020 
Innovation 
Indicator Rank 
GDP per capita in 
PPS (EU28=100) 
Luxemburg 25.4 1.0 4 264 
Netherlands 15.2 13.4 10 133 
Ireland 20.1 56.9 3 130 
Austria 14.2 13.8 9 129 
Sweden 17.6 21.7 2 126 
Denmark 15.5 25.7 6 125 
Germany 15.8 24.9 1 123 
Belgium 15.2 20.4 11 120 
Finland 15.5 7.1 5 116 
UK 17.8 22.6 7 107 
France 14.3 22.6 8 107 
Italy 13.2 13.2 17 101 
EU28 13.9 20.0  100 
Cyprus 16.9 7.5 18 94 
Spain 11.9 13.5 21 94 
Malta 17.0 0.0 16 85 
Slovenia 14.1 16.2 14 82 
Czech Republic 12.5 15.4 13 82 
Portugal 9.0 7.5 24 76 
Greece 12.3 5.9 23 74 
Slovakia 10.1 15.2 15 74 
Estonia 10.8 4.8 19 71 
Lithuania 9.1 3.3 28 69 
Poland 9.7 9.4 20 66 
Hungary 12.5 23.8 12 65 
Croatia 10.4 8.7 25 61 
Latvia 10.3 0.9 27 60 
Romania 6.5 6.4 22 53 
Bulgaria 8.3 6.6 26 45 
Source: Eurostat, European Commission. 
Comparing the EU innovation indicator rank and GDP per capita leads to a couple of 
observations: 
                                                 
13 R&D intensity in financial services in the UK was 0.3% in 2013, compared with 4.4% in total manufacturing, 
based on OECD MSTI data. 
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- Some countries with relatively large shares of knowledge-intensive sectors (e.g., catching 
up countries such as Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, in technology-driven 
manufacturing, but also advanced countries such as the UK, in education-intensive 
sectors) achieve relatively high innovation scores compared with their level of GDP per 
capita. 
- Some countries with relatively lower shares of knowledge-intensive sectors achieve better 
GDP per capita compared with their scores (e.g., Spain, Italy, Portugal, but also the 
Netherlands and Austria, in particular in technology-driven manufacturing). 
High shares of knowledge-intensive sectors have been shown to be associated with GDP 
levels and growth (e.g. Peneder, 2003), so policy-wise the second group of countries should 
clearly be very worried. Given that markets are open and globally competitive, one wonders 
how these countries achieve their GDP performance given their low average innovation 
scores and relatively high wages. We suspect that in some instances, the first group of 
countries may not be at the top end of quality ladders (with the exception possibly of 
countries benefitting from large financial services sectors), or further away from the frontier 
in knowledge-intensive sectors, while in the second group, countries are closer to the frontier 
in less knowledge-intensive sectors. 
3.2 A modified version of the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator 
In the preceding sections we argued that the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator has a strong focus 
on structural change as a mechanism for promoting innovativeness at the country level, while 
it neglects structural upgrading. In order to illustrate our framework, we compare the EU 2020 
Innovation Indicator with an indicator, called the SU indicator in what follows. Out of the 
three indicators of structural upgrading we outlined in section 2.3 we chose (1) the export 
quality and (2) the sector-adjusted R&D intensity.14 We then present the results for a modified 
EU 2020 Innovation Indicator which is calculated as the arithmetic average of the four 
                                                 
14 More details on how the two structural upgrading indicators are calculated are provided in the Appendix. 
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indicators used in the EU 2020 indicator and the two indicators of the SU indicator.15 If our 
arguments are valid, we should observe that countries with a focus on sectors classified 
through international averaging as knowledge-intensive perform better in the EU 2020 
Innovation Indicator than in the modified version when they are further away from the 
frontier in these sectors.  
Table 2 shows the country values for the two upgrading indicators outlined in section 2.316, 
next to the four components of the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator. We see that some countries 
with relatively high or close to average shares of knowledge-intensive sectors show very 
negative values in the indicator for sector-adjusted R&D intensity, implying that they are 
active in the less knowledge intensive segments of these activities, possibly focusing on 
product assembly (e.g. Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia or Malta).17 Some countries with 
relatively lower shares of knowledge-intensive sectors show less negative adjusted R&D 
intensity (e.g., Portugal, Spain, Italy) than the group above, others even very positive values, 
implying specialisation in the top R&D-intensive segment of less knowledge-intensive sectors 
(e.g., Austria, Belgium, Netherlands). In export quality as well, countries such as Italy achieve 
a higher value than countries such as Luxemburg and the Czech Republic which are above 
Italy in the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator. Some top performers such as Denmark and 
Sweden are good in all indicators, suggesting that they are both specialised in knowledge-
intensive industries as well as at the top of the quality ladders within those activities.  
Figure 3 compares the SU indicator, built as a linear average of the export quality indicator 
and the sector-adjusted R&D expenditures, with the linear average of the four components of 
the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator. The left panel of Figure 3 shows differences in ranks 
resulting from their values, as the ranks are often the most important policy information 
                                                 
15 As the focus of the current paper is more conceptual, we will not go into the issue of weights used in 
composite indicators, and will use one of the simpler weighting methods. The problem of weights used in 
composite indicators has been discussed elsewhere (e.g., Grupp and Schubert, 2010)  
16 It should be noted that some data problems are present in our analyses. In small countries, small export 
volumes reduce the robustness of export quality data (e.g., Cyprus, Malta). For Ireland and Croatia, sector-
adjusted R&D data are not available. We are very grateful to the authors of the cited papers for providing us with 
the data, in particular Irene Langer, Susanne Sieber and Fabian Unterlass. 
17 We refer again to the two taxonomies used in table 1, “KIA” and the technology-driven manufacturing sectors.  
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triggering further analysis.18 Countries with a negative score on Figure 3 have a lower ranking 
according to the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator than according to the SU indicator. 
Table 2: Original values of the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator and the SU indicator, 2012 
 PCT KIA COMP DYN Sector-
adjusted 
R&D 
intensity 
Export 
quality 
EU28 4.0 13.9 5.8 17.9 -0.13 72.6 
Austria 5.4 14.2 5.1 17.2 0.48 75.4 
Belgium 4.0 15.2 5.1 15.6 0.30 67.9 
Bulgaria 0.4 8.3 3.4 16.2 -0.72 42.7 
Croatia 0.8 10.4 3.5 15.0 ... 54.2 
Cyprus 0.3 16.9 4.5 16.7 -0.52 70.0 
Czech Rep. 0.7 12.5 5.6 18.7 -1.05 63.6 
Denmark 6.6 15.5 6.2 18.5 0.84 76.9 
Estonia 2.3 10.8 4.8 14.7 0.36 56.1 
Finland 10.5 15.5 4.9 17.1 1.42 70.4 
France 4.2 14.3 5.6 20.8 0.43 79.0 
Germany 7.8 15.8 6.9 19.1 0.00 84.1 
Greece 0.4 12.3 4.2 16.8 -0.43 38.3 
Hungary 1.5 12.5 5.5 19.1 -1.57 67.2 
Ireland 2.4 20.1 6.9 21.8 ... 88.6 
Italy 2.1 13.2 4.8 15.3 -0.64 67.9 
Latvia 0.5 10.3 3.9 11.3 -0.89 52.9 
Lithuania 0.4 9.1 3.0 12.3 -0.90 39.7 
Luxembourg 1.7 25.4 7.1 18.8 ... 52.8 
Malta 0.7 17.0 4.5 17.5 -1.89 76.1 
Netherlands 5.5 15.2 4.4 16.2 0.12 64.4 
Poland 0.5 9.7 4.8 19.3 -1.15 45.3 
Portugal 0.6 9.0 4.2 14.7 -0.25 55.4 
Romania 0.2 6.5 5.6 16.0 -1.57 48.7 
Slovakia 0.5 10.1 5.4 19.2 -1.61 73.5 
Slovenia 3.2 14.1 4.7 15.3 0.08 63.7 
Spain 1.7 11.9 4.5 15.9 -0.57 57.4 
Sweden 10.1 17.6 5.3 18.9 1.20 80.1 
United Kingdom 3.3 17.8 6.6 18.6 -0.15 79.7 
Source: Vertesy and Tarantola (2014) and authors’ own calculations. Note: no data for Croatia, Ireland and 
Luxembourg in the sector-adjusted R&D intensity; export data for very small countries such as Luxembourg, 
Malta and Cyprus to be interpreted with caution.  
                                                 
18 Note that due to the different weighting, the ranks for some countries are slightly different than in Table 1 for 
the EU 2020 indicator, but the direction of change is unaffected. 
 22 
Figure 3: Change in ranks: SU indicator vs. EU 2020 Innovation Indicator (left panel), 
modified EU 2020 indicator vs. EU 2020 Innovation Indicator (right panel) 
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Source: Vertesy and Tarantola (2014) and authors’ own calculations. The full set of normalised values is 
provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
The comparison between the SU indicator and the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator reveals that 
several countries outlined above as showing relatively high specialisation in knowledge-
intensive sectors, without necessarily being at the frontier in these activities, perform worse in 
the upgrading indicator in terms of losing several ranks (e.g., Hungary, Czech Republic, but 
also Luxembourg, which profits from large financial services). Among the “winning” 
countries are several which tend to focus on less knowledge-intensive sectors, but are at a 
higher position on the rungs of the quality ladder (e.g., Portugal, Italy, Belgium and Austria). 
Some countries do equally well on both dimensions of innovation outcomes (e.g., Sweden, 
France, Denmark). 
This brief analysis supports the view that an indicator set that ignores elements of structural 
upgrading consistently understates dimensions of innovative performance that are more 
pertinent in countries focusing on sectors with less knowledge intensity, and overrates 
innovation outcomes of less-knowledge intensive activities within knowledge-intensive 
sectors. We next evaluate the strength of the bias resulting from the omission of the structural 
upgrading component. To this end we construct a modified EU 2020 indicator, which is 
calculated as the arithmetic average of the four indicators of the EU 2020 Innovation 
 23 
Indicator19 and the two indicators of the SU indicator. As the modified indicator contains 
more “change” than “upgrading” components, structural change receives higher weight. 
Although the literature surveyed in section 2 would actually support a higher weight for 
upgrading than used in the modified indicator, this point requires further research. We 
compare the results for the ranking according to the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator and the 
modified EU 2020 indicator in the right panel of Figure 3. Again, countries with a negative 
score on Figure 3 have a lower ranking according to the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator than 
according to the modified EU 2020 indicator. 
The results of the ranking confirm that primarily countries specialised in knowledge-intensive 
sectors which are further away from the frontier perform worse under the modified indicator. 
Examples include Hungary (rank 14 instead of 10), the Czech Republic (15 instead of 13) and 
Slovakia (16 instead of 15). Countries with large financial sectors but few other innovation 
outcomes (the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator implies that the size of financial services 
contributes to innovation outcomes) lose as well (e.g., Luxemburg ranks 8 instead of 3). 
Among the countries that would gain under the modified version of the EU 2020 indicator are 
countries specialised in less knowledge-intensive sectors and focusing on high quality, such 
as Italy (17 instead of 19) and Portugal (22 instead of 24). Some countries that already did 
well in the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator even improve their position when structural 
upgrading is taken into account (e.g., Finland, Sweden, Denmark) while some countries 
which were already low ranking in the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator also stay at the bottom 
in the modified version (e.g., Latvia and Lithuania). 
Our analyses should be understood as a first attempt at shedding more light on the process of 
structural upgrading, with clear room for further improvement. Data are not available for all 
countries; unit values are not always related to product quality; and clearly, additional 
indicators are needed to cover further upgrading dimensions, such as quality in services 
(exports). In spite of these limitations, in terms of the range of innovation outcomes covered 
in both manufacturing and services, it adds upgrading dimensions to the EU indicator and is 
                                                 
19 This procedure deviates from the one used by the EU Commission which assigns different weights to each 
component (COMP: 0.43, PCT: 0.23, KIA: 0.18, DYN: 0.15). 
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hence relevant for a much larger part of the EU economies (e.g., the knowledge-intensive 
activities in the KIA indicator make up between 10-20% of most EU economies, while our 
outcome indicators cover potentially the whole market economy (sector-adjusted R&D 
intensity) and all of manufacturing (export quality).  
In summary, we find that neglecting structural upgrading penalises countries that are close to 
the frontier in less knowledge-intensive sectors. By contrast, countries which boast large 
financial sectors or which are part of international value chains in knowledge-intensive 
sectors but at the least knowledge-intensive part of the chain (e.g., assembly) obtain higher 
rankings. Finally, countries that perform equally well (or equally poorly) on both dimensions 
are least affected by the omission of structural upgrading indicators. 
4 Conclusions 
European research and innovation policy over the past decade focused considerably on 
increasing inputs to innovation. In 2002 the Barcelona goal was announced, aimed at bringing 
R&D expenditure in the EU to 3 percent of GDP by 2010. When this target was not reached, 
2020 was set as the new target year. In order to evaluate the efficiency of increasing inputs, a 
thorough understanding and monitoring of the outputs and outcomes to be achieved by these 
inputs is needed. We showed that the new EU 2020 Innovation Indicator does make an 
attempt in this direction, but falls short in terms of measuring innovation outputs and in terms 
of the dimensions of innovation outcomes it captures.  
Measuring innovation outputs and outcomes for the purpose of indicator-based country 
comparisons is difficult. The EU 2020 Innovation Indicator mainly focuses on innovation 
outcomes and includes little information on output. It only uses patents, which we have 
argued are difficult to use as an innovation output indicator because they conceptually do not 
need to imply actual innovations. In that respect the patent indicator used in the EU 2020 
Innovation Indicator should be considered as measuring the ”throughputs”, but not the outputs 
of innovation, contrary to the title of the communication by the EC (2013).  
Throughputs are conceptually closer to the capability to create new knowledge, rather than to 
translate this knowledge into commercially successful products, or to derive economic 
benefits from this new knowledge. However, if one is interested in these economic benefits of 
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innovation, which is the declared aim of the EC as stated in its communication (2013), then 
information on the quantity and quality of innovation throughput and output (e.g., how many 
innovations introduced, how path-breaking they are from a technological perspective) matters 
less than information on innovation outcomes, i.e. the economic impacts of innovations.  
We argue that for adequately measuring innovation outcomes at the country level, both 
structural change (reallocating economic activity towards more knowledge-intensive sectors) 
and structural upgrading (getting closer to the frontier in sectors countries are already 
specialised in) should be considered. The latter is certainly a major innovation outcome and 
reflects an important trend in competitive strategy. In order to defend competitive advantage 
against low-cost competitors, countries attempt to climb up the quality ladder and move to 
more innovation-based activities within a given sector. At the same time, structural upgrading 
mirrors the increased path dependency of technological progress due to more complex 
knowledge bases. So far, the structural upgrading dimension has been widely neglected in 
innovation outcome indicators and is barely integrated in innovation performance rankings.  
This is also true for the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator as three out of the four components 
primarily focus on structural change as an innovation outcome; the patent indicator reinforces 
this focus on knowledge-intensive sectors. This is somewhat surprising given the priority of 
EU policy on smart specialisation, which acknowledges the merits of strengthening industries 
that have comparative advantages regardless of being high-tech or low-tech, knowledge-
intensive or capital-intensive. The EU 2020 Innovation Indicator systematically favours 
countries specialised in industries classified as more knowledge-intensive, even if the actual 
activities performed within the country are not that knowledge intensive. At the same time, it 
neglects important innovation outcomes in terms of upgrading, thereby underrating countries 
that are specialised and close to the frontier in less knowledge-intensive sectors.  
For policy makers, the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator will be of little additional value as it 
does not address sufficiently well the questions that are typically posed to a policy-oriented 
innovation indicator: How successful is my country in terms of innovation outputs and in 
particular eventual outcomes? Does my country invest enough given its specific situation? 
How well do inputs eventually translate into outcomes? In fact, the indicator may even 
mislead policy makers and discourage from further investment. If higher investment in R&D 
and innovation is not mirrored in better outcome measures, innovation policy makers will find 
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it difficult to argue for higher budgets, particularly in a situation of tight government budgets 
and calls for cuts in government expenditure. A proper and comprehensive measurement of 
innovation outcomes is hence critical for demonstrating the importance of higher investment 
into the generation and exploitation of new knowledge. 
We believe that measuring innovation outcome in a comprehensive way based on indicators 
requires a more balanced approach than the one chosen by the European Commission. Our 
article can in itself be seen as a response to the call of the High Level Panel on Innovation 
Measurement (2013, p. 24) for a “substantial research effort on conceptual foundations” as 
well as empirics of innovation measurement, which it could not provide due to the limited 
time available for its report. We propose a conceptual framework that stresses the differences 
between structural change and structural upgrading as two important dimensions of 
innovation outcomes and show that results can differ quite substantially for some countries if 
structural upgrading is taken into account. In times of globalisation of innovation systems and 
fragmented value chains, it is not enough to look at between-sector variation only. We need to 
take into account the actual innovation outcomes and look at within-sector variation as well, 
and consider the positions countries assume in different segments of the quality ladder. 
General knowledge intensity of sectors (calculated as an international average) needs to be 
combined with variations in the actual knowledge intensity within sectors. Such an approach 
covers the entire business sectors and not just a narrow subset of pre-defined sectors.   
In policy terms, our framework opens up a potentially fruitful agenda for further research, as 
drivers of structural change can now be compared to drivers of “upgrading”. Depending on 
their starting position, countries may strive for higher shares of knowledge-intensive sectors 
and/or move towards more knowledge-intensive activities across all sectors. E.g., countries at 
the top of the quality ladder in less knowledge-intensive sectors may prioritise efforts to 
diversify into new areas of strength, using tools such as fostering spin-offs from academic 
research. By contrast, countries further away from the frontier in knowledge-intensive sectors 
may aim to upgrade through an increase in the innovation intensity of existing firms, e.g. 
through R&D subsidy programmes or increased cooperation of firms with universities. There 
is a clear case for further empirical research on how science, technology and innovation 
policies influence the two dimensions of innovation outcomes.  
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In terms of innovation outcome measurement, more work is clearly needed to improve 
indicators. The upgrading component of outcomes needs to be covered by additional 
indicators, showing complementary dimensions. A major step forward would be to measure 
the actual innovativeness of fast growing firms and their contribution to employment in all 
sectors, rather than just measuring the employment share of fast growing firms in knowledge-
intensive sectors. This would also better illustrate upgrading in services. While our sector-
adjusted R&D measure covers manufacturing and services, our measure of export quality is 
restricted to manufacturing. With regard to indicators on structural change, while both 
manufacturing and services are included, different industry classifications at the international 
level complicate comparisons (as also pointed out by the High Level Panel, 2013), calling for 
better harmonised industry classifications. Determining the relative importance of 
“upgrading” and “change” for improving a country’s innovation performance would be 
helpful, too. This can also inspire the further investigation of the relationships between 
outputs and outcomes to inform policies about their effectiveness. 
While we have not contributed to improving output measurement, we have outlined that the 
subjective approach has difficulties developing internationally comparable measures of 
innovation output, while the objective approach is too cumbersome and patents have well 
known limitations. At the same time, existing statistical tools to measure innovation outputs 
have to be advanced with a view on better international and inter-sectoral comparability. This 
is particularly true for innovation surveys of the CIS-type which theoretically should serve 
research and policy with data on innovation outputs, but so far have largely failed to deliver. 
There is hence a clear need for further research on appropriate indicators for outputs and 
outcomes. Based on a new conceptual framework, we hope that our article will provide a new 
impetus for research on innovation output and outcome measurement which will eventually 
contribute to reducing uncertainty in policymaking. 
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6 Appendix 
Table A1: Full range of normalised values for indicators used in section 3 
 PCT KIA COMP DYN Sector-
adjusted 
R&D 
intensity 
Export 
quality 
EU2020 
modi-
fied 
SU indi-
cator 
EU2020 
original 
EU28 0.37 0.39 0.68 0.63 0.53 0.68 0.55 0.38 0.52 
Belgium 0.37 0.46 0.52 0.41 0.66 0.59 0.50 0.41 0.44 
Bulgaria 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.47 0.35 0.09 0.19 0.06 0.17 
Czech Rep. 0.06 0.32 0.63 0.70 0.25 0.50 0.41 0.19 0.43 
Denmark 0.62 0.48 0.77 0.69 0.82 0.77 0.69 0.55 0.64 
Germany 0.73 0.49 0.94 0.74 0.57 0.91 0.73 0.61 0.73 
Estonia 0.21 0.23 0.44 0.32 0.68 0.35 0.37 0.22 0.30 
Ireland 0.22 0.72 0.96 1.00 ... 1.00 0.78 0.47 0.72 
Greece 0.02 0.31 0.30 0.52 0.44 0.00 0.27 0.16 0.29 
Spain 0.15 0.29 0.38 0.44 0.40 0.38 0.34 0.22 0.31 
France 0.39 0.41 0.63 0.90 0.70 0.81 0.64 0.40 0.59 
Italy 0.19 0.35 0.44 0.38 0.38 0.59 0.39 0.27 0.34 
Cyprus 0.01 0.55 0.38 0.51 0.41 0.63 0.42 0.28 0.36 
Latvia 0.03 0.20 0.21 0.00 0.30 0.29 0.17 0.12 0.11 
Lithuania 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.03 0.10 0.08 0.06 
Luxembourg 0.14 1.00 1.00 0.71 ... 0.29 0.63 0.57 0.71 
Hungary 0.13 0.32 0.60 0.74 0.10 0.57 0.41 0.22 0.45 
Malta 0.05 0.56 0.36 0.59 0.00 0.75 0.38 0.31 0.39 
Netherlands 0.52 0.46 0.34 0.47 0.61 0.52 0.49 0.49 0.45 
Austria 0.51 0.41 0.50 0.56 0.72 0.74 0.57 0.46 0.49 
Poland 0.03 0.17 0.43 0.76 0.22 0.14 0.29 0.10 0.35 
Portugal 0.05 0.13 0.28 0.32 0.50 0.34 0.27 0.09 0.20 
Romania 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.45 0.10 0.21 0.23 0.00 0.27 
Slovenia 0.29 0.40 0.41 0.38 0.60 0.50 0.43 0.35 0.37 
Slovakia 0.03 0.19 0.58 0.75 0.08 0.70 0.39 0.11 0.39 
Finland 1.00 0.48 0.45 0.55 1.00 0.64 0.69 0.74 0.62 
Sweden 0.96 0.59 0.57 0.72 0.93 0.83 0.77 0.77 0.71 
Unit. Kingdom 0.31 0.60 0.89 0.70 0.53 0.82 0.64 0.45 0.62 
Croatia 0.06 0.21 0.14 0.35 0.37 0.32 0.21 0.13 0.19 
Source: Vertesy and Tarantola (2014) and authors’ own calculations.  
Calculation of sector-adjusted R&D intensity 
Direct comparisons of R&D expenditures relative to GDP are flawed as especially the 
business R&D expenditures (BERD) are heavily influenced by the industrial structure of each 
country. Smith and Sandven (1998) have therefore proposed a decomposition that identifies 
country and sector effects in BERD and therefore permits to compare R&D intensities in the 
business sector across countries. Starting point for the decomposition is the observation that  
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where  and are the aggregate R&D expenditures of the business sector M in 
country j,  and the index i = 1,..,n indexes the single industries i. Variables  and  are 
then the industry specific R&D intensities and the weight of the sector in aggregate business 
sector output ܸܣܯ,݆.  
Simple expansions of the above expression yield 
 
and  
 
where  and  are the averages of the R&D intensity in industry i and the contribution to 
value added of industry i to the aggregate output of the business sector respectively. Averages 
for  and  are taken over a group of benchmark countries.20 The first right hand side 
component of equation (2) presents the industry structure effect in aggregate BERD. It 
presents the intensity of aggregate business R&D if all business sectors would invest into 
R&D at levels equaling the cross country average of the benchmark countries. The second 
right hand side component of equation (2) captures the country effect on BERD. It is the 
weighted sum of the sector specific deviations of industry specific R&D intensities from the 
cross country industry specific average R&D intensity. Equation (3) instead decomposes the 
second right hand side (RHS) term of equation (2) further into an effect due to the change of 
                                                 
20 The following countries have been selected as benchmark countries: AT, BE, DE, DK, FI, FR, NL, NO, SE, 
UK, US. 
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R&D intensity in the industries of a country (second RHS term in equation 3) and an 
interaction effect combining the effect of differences in industrial structure and the effect of 
change in R&D intensity across industries in a country (third RHS term in equation 3). 
This decomposition allows for a comparison of R&D expenditures across countries by 
separating structural effects from country specific effects. Controlling for industry structure it 
is therefore possible to compare whether in the aggregate the industries in a country perform 
better or worse in comparison to the group of benchmark countries. 
In order to carry out this comparison data from different sources have been consolidated into 
one data set. The principal data sources for this analysis are taken from the OECD’s databases 
STAN and ANBERD as well as Eurostat’s BERD and Value Added databases. In assembling 
the database for the decomposition analysis several issues had to be dealt with. The principal 
problems were missing values either for the value added or the BERD data, inconsistencies in 
the classification of industries across countries and/or over time leading in some cases 
discontinuities, gaps and anomalies in the data. In particular, while the decomposition is 
mainly based on the NACE (Rev. 2) 2-digits level, some of the industries had to be 
aggregated.21  
Calculation of the export quality indicator 
The calculation of the export quality indicator is based on export unit values in manufacturing 
which are used to define price segments within each 6-digit NACE (Rev. 2) sector (see also 
Aiginger, 1997, for a discussion of the relationship between unit values and product quality). 
Manufacturing exports data for 2012 are taken from the Eurostat Comext database. 27 
individual EU member states with the exception of Croatia are covered, for each of them all 
reported bilateral exports values and quantities are used. For Malta and Luxemburg a smaller 
                                                 
21 The following sector aggregates have been used (if deviating from the 2-digits level): 01-03, 05-09, 10-12, 
10-33, 13-15, 31-32, 35-36, 37-39, 41-43, 45-47, 49-53, 55-56, 59-60, 62-63, 64-66, 69-75 (excl. 72), 77-82, 87-
88, 90-93, 94-99. 
 35 
set of unit values was available, therefore the result for these countries should be interpreted 
with caution. 
Bilateral export unit values in 6-digit NACE (Rev. 2) sector j are calculated as the ratio of 
values of exports P*Q from country k to country s (expressed in €) to quantities M of the 
same exports (in kg), whenever both information on export values as well as quantities is 
available and when they are above a certain threshold (10,000€ for values and 2 tons for 
quantities). 
 
Afterwards for each 6-digit NACE level sector j, the 33.3 and 66.7 percentiles P of the 
distribution of all bilateral export unit values of the 27 individual EU member states covered 
are defined as cut-off points or boundaries B for three price segments (high, medium or low) 
as a proxy for quality segments. 
 
 
The boundaries are identical for all countries at the 6-digit level. These boundaries are then 
used to classify each bilateral export value at the 6-digit level into one of the three price 
segments S, for example all unit values below the 33.3 percentile threshold form therefore the 
low price segment category S across all countries 
 
In the end, the corresponding exports’ values P*Q are summed up for each country k to 
different aggregation levels (total country exports – all sectors N - as well as groups of 
sectors) for each price segment category. The resulting aggregated export values for the low, 
medium and high price segment are than expressed as the respective share in total exports E 
of country k, for the example of the low price segment: 
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Figure A1: Innovation outputs and outcomes in an innovation production process model 
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Source: Authors’ own presentation.  
A formal conceptual model of innovation outcomes at the firm and industry levels 
Figure A2 starts with innovation outcomes at the firm level, which relate to the characteristics 
of innovation output: First, changes to existing products and processes can affect production 
costs C of product i (e.g., through increased process quality), decreasing C or keeping C 
constant relative to competing firms, which are also trying to reduce costs. Depending on the 
amount of relative cost reduction and ensuing price setting, value added Va and market shares 
MS generated by product i may remain unchanged or increase following changes in quantities 
sold Q. Innovations can also change product quality A, keeping product quality unchanged 
relative to competitors or increasing it, with impacts on value added or market shares as a 
function of corresponding price setting. Second, a new product j generates value added levels 
net of any substitution effects with the older product i it may replace, indicated by an 
elasticity of substitution . These outcomes of innovation activity at the firm level translate 
either into economic effects of innovation changing the sector composition of activities 
(structural change through higher value added growth of industries characterised by high 
knowledge intensity (VAKI) relative to industries showing lower knowledge intensity (VANKI)); 
or into changing the intra-sector composition of activities, by moving towards segments of 
higher knowledge intensity within the same industry. 
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Figure A2: A formal conceptual model of innovation outcomes at the firm and industry 
levels 
1. Improvingexistingproduct/process: Pi*Qi(Ai)‐Ci*Qi(Ai)=Vai
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Source: Authors’ own presentation.  
 
